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RECENT BOOKS 
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Morton A. 
Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
1961. Pp. xi, 372. $6.95. 
The stated objective of this book is to "make use of a systems theory 
of international politics" to relate "the norms of international law to thejr 
political foundations." (p. v) More concretely, the authors' aim is to set 
forth the difference between international law in the two systems: the 
nineteenth century "balance of power" system and the prevailing "loose 
bipolar system." The authors also expect to show that state behavior neither 
is, nor ought to be, given solely to the pursuit or acquisition of power, as is 
asserted by the neo-realists, but that it also is subject to normative constraints. 
They wish to illustrate the reciprocal relation between politics and law: 
the political systems impose constraints on international law, and inter-
national law imposes constraints on political behavior. These being the 
main objectives, the authors do not attempt an exhaustive or even a com-
plete analysis of the corpus of international law. The student is advised 
to use a good case book as supplementary reading. Let it be said at once 
that this is eminently sound advice. 
In pursuing their inquiry the authors follow guidelines which are not 
made explicit. What goes into or out of a chapter is a matter of continuous 
surprise to the reader. Thus in chapter one he will find some random re-
marks about characteristic features of domestic or of international 1aw, 
about the nature of customary and conventional law, and about general 
principles and the moderating influence of international law. The sources 
of international law are discussed in greater detail in chapter nine, and the 
role of international law in the final chapter. In chapter two, the authors 
show the interdependence between international law and political systems. 
Here the model and systems are introduced: the "balance of power" model, 
which corresponds to international politics in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, and the loose bipolar model of the international system, 
which corresponds to current international politics. The period from about 
1871, when the "balance of power" system lost some of its "flexibility" of 
alignment, to the emergence of bipolarity after World War II, is somehow 
left dangling, although it is much longer than the period from 1815 to 1871, 
the heyday of the classic flexible balance of power system. Now the models 
set certain requirements. For instance, according to the first model "the 
relationships of nations to one another must be competitive, suspicious 
and primarily instrumental"; (p. 32) they were, as postulated by the model, 
in a "state of equilibrium"; (p. 34) and they provided non-interference in 
the affairs of the nations. (p. 36) It is fortunate indeed that this was so, 
for if it were othenvise there would be something wrong with the model. 
History cannot be reversed to fit a model, though it can be reinterpreted, 
but models can be reconstructed to fit historical reality. In any event, the 
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burden of the argument here is that the rules of international law which 
prevailed or evolved during the nineteenth century, along with other 
factors, made it possible for the states to maintain flexibility of alignment 
and a degree of peace. The fl.at statement, however, that "the period from 
1870 to 1945, with brief interludes, was a period in which conflicting 
standards were asserted by nations acting within a changing and transitory 
social structure," (p. 44) can hardly be accepted without more evidence 
than is provided for it. The assertion of conflicting standards is the lot of 
international law at any period, and, as to the social structure, it is argu-
able at least that the industrial revolution, the emergence of the third estate, 
the rise of capitalism and trade, the transition from a largely rural to a 
largely urban society, and the development of technology in communica-
tions were phenomena which characterized the nineteenth century, al-
though there may have been changes in the speed of acceleration. 
The authors stand on firmer ground if they assert that the period be-
tween the two world wars was one of social turmoil, but it is more than 
doubtful when they assert that this period did not "produce standards of 
international law which had reasonable prospects for acceptance." (p. 44) 
Much of the law-making activity was merely a continuation of nineteenth 
century efforts. The law of air was developed and universally accepted. 
Much progress was made in the fields of labor, health and opium control. 
Even the Covenant had a "reasonable prospect for acceptance," though 
events in the thirties provided a retrogressive movement. The law of war 
remained unsettled, as usually is the case after a major war. Generally, 
this period saw a great activity in the field of international adjudication 
which firmed up and clarified many standards of international law and of 
its interpretation and application. 
The authors refer to the Hague tribunals and the League of Nations 
as "sufficient evidence that the old system was collapsing." (p. 49) This 
is an odd proposition. The Hague tribunals, which probably means the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, were based on the principle of voluntary submission, and in this 
respect they did not differ from the nineteenth century. In any event it 
would require more argument than is found in the book to show that 
peaceful settlement of disputes is incompatible with the "balance of power" 
system as it was practiced, though it may be incompatible with a con-
trived model of that system. As to the League, it did not cause but fol-
lowed a spectacular collapse of the system. Rather than relying on voluntary 
self-restraint which proved to be not dependable, the Covenant made self-
restraint a matter of legal obligation. The Covenant put a damper on self-
help, the Corfu Island incident to the contrary notwithstanding, and in 
the Western Hemisphere the principle of non-intervention was firmly ac-
cepted for the first time. Article 15, paragraph 8, of the Covenant was 
judicially clarified and firmly applied by the League Council. Such inter-
ference as there was in matters of protection of minorities and mandates 
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rested on treaty commitments which were expressive of trends clearly vis-
ible in the nineteenth century. The nineteenth century rule of the game 
relating to limitations of objectives was made a matter of legal obligation 
in article 10 of the Covenant. Both the rule and article 10 were disregarded 
in practice, however. 
The loose bipolar system consists of two blocs, a large number of un-
committed nations, and a universal organization, the United Nations. In 
his earlier work, Kaplan presented this system as characterized by partici-
pation of supranational as well as national actors. The class of suprana-
tional actors is divided into the sub-class of "bloc actors," of which NATO 
and the Communist bloc are examples, and "universal actors," of which 
the United Nations is an example. Each bloc has a leading actor, presum-
ably the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, which constitute 
the "gravitational poles" of the system.1 The norms of international law 
in this system are different from those which prevailed in the "balance 
of power" system: the blocs have supranational characteristics, the align-
ment is relatively stable, and "the particular motives for limitation of 
objectives and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations that 
operated in the 'balance of power' system do not operate in the loose bipolar 
system." (p. 50) The question of the supranational actors will be taken 
up later. It is sufficient to point out here that they are essential to Kaplan's 
model. The absence of a limitation of objectives is a question of fact and 
the events since 1945 do not furnish conclusive evidence one way or 
another. In the case of Korea, the one major war during the period, 
objectives became limited after it became obvious that the unification of 
Korea by force was not feasible. In a nuclear war between the blocs ob-
jectives might well become unlimited, not because of the nature of the 
system, but owing to the nature of the weapons systems that may be em-
ployed. Insofar as law is concerned it is reasonably clear: The Kellogg-
Briand Pact is probably still the law for the parties and this is in any case 
reinforced by the provisions of the Charter. If anything, the law is now 
more explicit and more restrictive of the freedom of action of the mem-
bers of the United Nations than it was in the "balance of power" system 
or in the inter-war period. With respect to non-interference there has 
probably been no major change in customary international law. Here too, 
the law as represented by article 2(7) of the Charter is more restrictive 
than article 15, paragraph 8, of the Covenant, but the practice is vastly 
different. The wholly political application of article 2, paragraph 7, re-
spects no boundaries or limitations. Kaplan is right in pointing out that 
within blocs the leading nation intervenes and interferes brutally as in 
Hungary or more subtly as in Italy,2 or not so subtly, as in Guatemala. 
The political style of both the United Nations and the leading powers is 
1 KAPLAN, SYSTEM AND POLITICS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 36 (1957). 
2 Here Kaplan refers to the elections of 1949. Id. at 51. 
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certainly different from that of the League and the great powers of that 
period. 
The third chapter in the introductory part is largely devoted to theories 
of international law at various epochs: theory before 1815, from Congress 
of Vienna to Second World War and, somewhat inconsistently, theory since 
1914. Positivism, as a school, largely tended to support the flexibility of 
alignment characteristic of the balance of power system. Some observations 
of state practice are mentioned along with doctrine, and some of them are 
questionable. 3 
It is quite remarkable that for the period since 1914 the authors could 
only think of American legal realism as a theory developed for or during 
this period so rich in theoretical work. This selection is all the more 
astonishing as the authors do not regard "legal realism" as developed in 
the United States as a theory or doctrine, but as an "intellectual potpourri," 
(p. 73) with an especial appeal to New Dealers. (p. 74) One of the un-
explained mysteries of this section is the involvement of Austin. (p. 75) Be 
that as it may, realism is what the authors believe in. Law is always an 
expression of public policy, law is a "policy science"; realism marks a re-
turn "to both humanism and individualism"; and, finally, law is regarded 
"as a process rather than a body of formal rules." (p. 74) The essence of 
international law appears accordingly as "the process of making effective 
decisions governing transnational events." (p. 79) Is it relevant that these 
decisions conform to formal rules or to "public policy"? The authors' 
preference seems clearly the latter, for in their view this process is today 
"increasingly subjected to effective restraints which limit the freedom of 
action of national officials and which promote policy choices which are 
compatible with an international political system of associated states which 
share (for the most part) a belief in human dignity for all persons." (pp. 79-
80) This amounts to a denial of an objective legal order in the relations 
of states, a denial of international law as understood and practiced by 
international judicial or arbitral institutions. The identification of inter-
national law and policy becomes even more explicit in the following sen-
tence which links international law with the policy of the United States: 
"The United States by reason of its power and resources (and Europe to 
a lesser extent) plays a leadership role in promoting compatible national 
policies through the resolution of disputes within the Free World, usually 
by a process of suggestion coupled with subsidy.''4 (p. 80) 
3 Such as on p. 63: "A nation such as Switzerland could be neutralized by agreement 
and could be relied upon to protect its neutrality; more doubtful, but possible, (with 
an assist from the North) was the neutralization of the Latin American countries; out of 
the question was the neutralization of Asia and Africa." One wonders what the import 
of this was intended to be. 
4 The authors have some trouble with their use of the term "policy" or "policies." 
Thus, speaking of the judicial process and the techniques peculiar to it, they say: "These 
techniques are primarily designed to insure impartiality between litigants and, in mod-
em times, subservience to policies laid down by other governmental organs." (p. 4) This 
will come as a shock to those who believe that ours is government under law. 
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The chapters devoted to substantive international law, which the au-
thors for some unfathomable reason group under the heading "doctrinal 
framework," and from which, for similar reasons, they omitted the sources 
of international law, cannot be reviewed here in any detail. The student 
will be well advised to turn to a good case book or to Oppenheim-Lauter-
pacht's treatise to learn about the subjects of international law, recognition, 
etc. The authors probably did not intend to do a thorough or systematic 
job of presentation, for both thoroughness and method are absent. Rather, 
one gets the impression of a hurried and eclectic job. The justification for 
taking up the substantive norms of international law would have been to 
show their relation to the political system and the changes that were 
wrought by the changes in systems. This the authors attempt to do but 
their argument is often lacking in persuasiveness. Some random remarks 
will have to suffice if the bounds of a book review are not to be exceeded. 
The authors' discussion of recognition is interesting. The stress on 
policy considerations connected with past and present practices is welcome. 
Less welcome is the intermingling of rules regarding succession of states 
and governments with recognition. No doubt these two areas of interna-
tional practice are connected sometimes, but not always, and problems of 
the former arise in cases where there is no problem of recognition. Relating 
recognition practices to political systems is tenuous at best. "De-factoism," 
which was the prevailing practice in the nineteenth century, gave way to 
the Wilsonian view even before World War I. The United Kingdom 
Memorandum of 1948 which advocates a return to "de-factoism" is not 
mentioned anywhere. Non-recognition of Communist China by the United 
States was originally based on grounds unrelated to the use of force against 
Formosa. The authors read too much into the present rather chaotic situ-
ation when they say that nineteenth century standards of recognition "can-
not prevail today." (p. 128) The Soviet Government did recognize the 
German Federal Republic, though the authors seem to imply the contrary, 
and, while it is true that it does not recognize the Taiwan regime, it is 
not the only country to fail to do so. (p. 127) 
A tighter grip on the subject and emphasis on underlying policy con-
siderations characterize the discussion of jurisdiction. Here there is but 
one reference to political systems and this is wholly unconvincing.5 The 
transition to the loose bipolar system seems to have brought about no 
changes in the law. Use of conventional terms would have facilitated 
communication between the authors and the reader, and there are inac-
curacies which could easily be avoided. The universality principle is adopted 
in a number of countries, was relevant in war crimes trials and presented 
a convenient basis for Israel's jurisdiction over Eichmann. To regard the 
NATO Status of Forces Agreement as representing customary law is far-
fetched to say the least. (p. 194) This view stems from the authors' posi-
5 "Jurisdiction over sovereigns would also have been inconsistent with the independ-
ence necessary to the desirable functioning of the 'balance of power' system." (p. 191) 
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tion that "armed forces admitted to the territory of a state enjoy a limited 
immunity" (p. 193) which is ambiguous. No reference is made to the 1958 
Geneva convention in connection with innocent passage. While it is true 
that, in the case of diplomats, immunity from jurisdiction is not to be 
construed as immunity from liability, there is hardly any basis for suggesting 
that "the diplomat will be punished by his state for the delict" committed 
in the territory of the receiving state. (p. 196) Similarly, one wonders what 
authority is relied upon for the proposition that "the rule of political 
asylum ... characterizes most practice outside the Communist bloc." (p. 197) 
Custom, general principles, publicists and judicial precedents are dis-
cussed more or less briefly and, of course, without reference to authority.6 
It is regrettably not always clear whether the authors have in mind usage 
which is not binding and customary international law which is.7 Some-
times it is impossible to fathom what the authors have in mind when they 
refer to general principles applied by "the judicial-administrative arms" 
of international agencies, such as are the International Labor Organization, 
or "the question whether "international arbitrators are free to decide ex 
aequo et bono." (p. 263) 
The League of Nations is presented as a mechanism to prevent the 
complete overturn of the "balance of power" system made necessary by 
the fact that "the process of 'balanc.ing' and flexibility of alignment cannot 
be depended upon to limit wars and to maintain the independent exist-
ence of the major states." (p. 288) As a substitute for the self-interest of 
states the League failed. It failed, in other words, because "no alliances 
existed to enforce" League principles. (p. 292) In fact, there were alliances 
and there was even the Locarno guarantee, but there was also chiefly a 
lack of political wisdom and a shortsighted estimate of self-interest. This 
lack of wisdom appeared as soon as the United States, in the words of the 
authors, "refused to accept its seat" (p. 284) in the League Council and 
refused to ratify the alliance with France and England providing for as-
sistance in case of attack by Germany. The "balance of power" system 
worked as long and as well as it did, not because of any inherent virtue, 
but because the statesmen who made up the Concert of Europe, which, 
incidentally, is never mentioned in this book, had greater wisdom in de-
termining the self-interest of the states they represented than their suc-
cessors in the League. 
It will be recalled that file existence of supranational actors of the sub-
class "bloc actors" is essential to the concept or model of the bipolar 
system. It is undeniable that blocs exist although the free world resists 
energetically Chairman Khrushchev's efforts to formally recognize and re-
6 It may surprise some readers to find the statement that the Scotia case "is often 
cited as one of the strongest cases demonstrating the existence of customary international 
law." (pp. 247-48) 
7 Cf. p. 251, "the belief that the rule binds because of its customary qualities is 
untenable," and p. 255, "whether or not they are codified in treaties, rules so generally 
supported are mandatory." 
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build the United Nations around them. And it may be pointless to argue 
whether "they are a response to bipolarity" (p. 315) or the reverse. What does 
matter is whether the blocs are in fact supranational organizations. It is 
generally accepted that the European communities represent this type to-
day. However, neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact have been regarded 
as such. To be sure the latter may be "supranational in a factual but not 
a formal sense that international law would be able to recognize." (p. ~32) 
This may be so because of the interlocking Communist parties of the par-
ticipating states and their factual, though not legal, subservience to the 
Soviet Government. If that is so, then the Warsaw Pact organization is 
more akin to the form of an empire than to the functional type of supra-
nationalism represented by the Coal and Steel Comm.unity. 
SEA TO, CENTO, the Council of Europe and the OAS are not supra-
national organizations by any stretch of the imagination.8 This leaves 
NATO as the only potential supranational bloc actor to satisfy the model. 
The authors make the most strenuous efforts to fit NATO into the pro-
crustean bed of the model. Whether they succeeded or failed must be left 
to the judgment of those who are as intimately acquainted with the inner 
workings of this organization as the authors appear to be. There is nothing 
in the treaty to support their view, as they admit. (p. 318) It is not cur-
rently accepted that "the Military Committee, designed to establish policy, 
and the Standing Group, which has executive functions, are supranational 
in scope." (p. 319) But it may well be that, in the command structure like 
in any military hierarchy, there are features of supranationalism, and that 
a war in Europe "would discover NATO asserting the functions of a supra-
national government and making the most vital decisions that any govern-
ment can be called upon to make." (p. 321) This contingency does not make 
NATO a supranational body today. The requirements of the model then 
may be met in war even if they are not, or not altogether, met in peace. 
In their conclusion the authors display a remarkably affirmative attitude 
toward international law. While not denying that in some cases states 
"would implement only national and not international values," (p. 342) 
they lay great and welcome stress on the advantages derived from self-
restraint and the reputation derived from law-abiding and principled be-
havior. They are most emphatic in declaring that "a principled nation, 
with a reputation for being principled, is less subject to black.mail and 
hard bargaining techniques than a nation that continually trims comers 
to gain some advantage." (p. 345) However, in order to be able to be prin-
cipled "a nation ought to commit itself only to principles with which it can 
live-and with which others can also live." (p. 345) Furthermore, a nation 
should not sacrifice long-term interests for the sake of short-term goals. 
A lengthy and detailed review can be justified, if at all, by the merits 
8 The French, German, Italian ·weapons Development Center "which is being estab-
lished" (p. 322) is said to have "the potential beginnings of an important supranational 
tendency." (p. 323) We have to take the authors' word for this. 
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of the book concerned. This is no ordinary book. It is interesting, trivial, 
exasperating and important. Any attempt at a sociological interpretation 
of international law is always welcome. Over the years there were several, 
each contributing some light with respect to the factors which determine 
or influence the growth or decay of rules of international law. The authors 
attempt to show systematically what the relationship is between interna-
tional law and politics. The accent is on "systematically" and cannot be 
elsewhere because, as they are well aware, the relationship itself was always 
understood. True enough, teaching or learning international law from 
case books may- tend to play down this relationship. The advantage is 
that cases are useful vehicles for discussing the policy issues involved in 
the application of abstract norms to concrete issues. One of the best fea-
tures of this book is the elaboration of these policy considerations. The 
authors, however, aimed higher than that, and it seems doubtful that 
they achieved their objective. The political systems may be taken for 
what they are. Certainly the authors do not provide a fundamental 
analysis of either the "balance of power" system or the "loose bipolar" sys-
tem. Operating with models precluded this. Now, accepting that the 
"balance of power" system presupposed or required flexibility of alignment, 
international law as formulated by Vattel9 was well suited for the task of 
diplomacy.10 All sorts of self-help, including intervention, were sanctioned, 
and the only practical restraint was self-restraint, the "internalized" 
sanction of which the authors speak. The resulting freedom of action 
could be, and was, used and abused subject to the restraining influence or 
action of the great powers acting in concert or individually. The two world 
wars, the disintegration of the Western community of values, economic dis-
location, technological advances, are among the factors which played havoc 
with international law.11 The shift in the location of power from Europe 
to the United States and the Soviet Union raised further problems for the 
stability and observance of international law, as did the establishment, 
functioning and demise of the League of Nations, and the establishment 
and functioning of the United Nations. Neither the United Nations nor 
the "supranational actors" have so far shown any exaggerated devotion to 
international law or the law of the Charter. What the bipolar system will 
do to either or to both remains to be seen. What they have accomplished 
so far is, to say the least, not encouraging. However, it would be short-
sighted to relate the function of international law exclusively or predomi-
nantly to the political system. The authors are well aware of this.12 Any 
9 How curious that his work is omitted from the list of Classics of International Law 
edited by James Brown Scott and published by the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. See p. 356. 
10 See de Lapradelle's Introduction to Vattel, in the edition referred to in note 9 
supra. 
11 See Kunz, The Changing Law of Nations, 51 AM. J. INT'L LAW 77-83 (1957), and 
his lectures, La Crise et les Transformations du Droit des Gens, 88 HAGUE REcUEIL DES 
CoURS 1 (1955). 
12 Cf., e.g., p. 347. 
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concentration on a single factor is bound to be misleading in view of the 
complexity of international relations. If one looks for such a factor one 
wonders whether de Visscher's emphasis of the dynamics of international 
relations resulting from the struggle for hegemony, the hegemonial tensions, 
may not be preferable to emphasis on systems, particularly the bipolar 
system which to this reviewer, at any rate, appears to have a static quality. 
Be that as it may, the book is short on "systematic" analysis of the relation 
between law and political systems. To repeat and repeat again that inter-
vention or non-intervention are favored or discouraged in one epoch or 
another is not a systematic analysis. To select some aspects of international 
law and omit others is no systematic analysis either. Recognition practice 
is confused and confusing but this belongs to the realm of politics and not 
of law. From the point of view of law the non-recognition of the Soviet 
Union or of Communist China by the United States is hardly relevant on the 
international plane where the principle of effectiveness prevails. If there 
is one area of international law in which significant adaptations have been 
taking place, it is that of diplomatic protection generally and more par-
ticularly in connection with expropriation of property of aliens. This 
branch of law is almost totally ignored. Where law and systems are claimed 
to be related, the relation is more in the nature of a juxtaposition than 
of a systematic analysis of the impact of the systems upon law. 
The authors are attracted to McDougal's concept of customary inter-
national law as a process of "claims and concessions." This view is inim-
ical to norm stability. What it appears to amount to is the denial that 
there ever is a norm of customary international law binding upon states 
and not subject to change by unilateral fiat posited by the norm-contrary 
act. Admittedly, theorists on the nature of customary international law 
have not been able to come up with a satisfactory explanation of or 
agree among themselves on the "first act." Somewhere in the state prac-
tice a rule of customary international law has its inception and at some 
point of time usage hardens into a binding rule. At some point of time 
it becomes "unhinged," as it were; that is, it begins to lose its obligatory 
character, and the process starts all over again. Now then, is every act 
of a state to escape being judged or evaluated by scholars in terms of 
existing rules, if there be any, and to be judged and evaluated always 
and exclusively as a step in the never-ending process of law-making 
without creating law? If norm instability is better attuned to the loose 
bipolar system than norm stability, then indeed this doctrine would seem 
to serve this purpose admirably well. It affects not merely customary, but 
conventional international law, as well. It is a boon to the advocate and 
a bane to the scholar. For it should not be overlooked that bloc leaders 
appear to be either supremely indifferent to the forum of the United 
Nations or they manipulate majorities to their .advantage. The rule of 
law is the loser, for above all bloc leaders are allergic to the International 
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Court of Justice. It may be true, as the authors contend, that great powers 
will intervene but will not tolerate intervention. What is perhaps in even 
greater measure a matter of concern is that they will judge but will not 
be judged. 
The authors dispense completely with the usual methodology of schol-
arship which requires, as they point out themselves, "accurate statement 
and citation of authorities, including those that do not support their con-
clusions." (p. 260) If they do not conform to this standard among others 
they lose status as scholars. "Hence, what the scholar states to be prevailing 
doctrine ought to have considerable foundation, ought to be capable of 
verification by others, and ought to employ the same sources acknowledged 
by formal decision makers. What he says is both based upon, and inevita-
bly an addition to, what went before." (p. 260) The authors have elected 
to disregard their own prescription. There are no references to authority 
or source material, and the very brief bibliography is no adequate substitute. 
There are direct and indirect quotations without citations. Checking one's 
recollection against the source is useful discipline.13 It seems the fashion 
nowadays, encouraged or even fostered by publishers, to produce clean, un-
cluttered books. They may sell better but they do not conform to the 
requirements of scholarship, assuming, of course, that they were intended 
to be a contribution in that general direction. 
Leo Gross, 
Professor of International Law, 
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 
Tufts University 
13 Thus Anatole France is credited with the "sardonic comment about the law equally 
forbidding rich and poor to sleep on park benches." In this country one speaks collo• 
quially of people sleeping on park benches, but in Paris the poor proverbially sleep under 
bridges, and this is what Anatole France said, sardonically or otherwise. For even though 
he may be poor, the Frenchman is rational and logical in the choice of free and equal 
sleeping facilities. Under the bridge he is protected from the not infrequent rain and 
the inquisitive eye of the "fiic." 
